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Abstract
This study expanded the hitherto DSGE model with bank intermediation to include
informal credit intermediation. The modeling strategy assumed that both formal and
informal banks operate in a common credit market performing the same activities,
thus existing parallel to each other. Formal banks participate in the wholesale credit
market whiles informal banks do not. The purpose of this modeling approach is to
investigate the effect of the parallel activities of these banks on monetary transmission
mechanism.
The study found that the presences of informal intermediation affect how interest
rate react to monetary policy shocks. The effect however, depends on the relationship
between formal and informal bank in the intermediation process. The study estab-
lished that interest rates become very responsive to monetary policy if formal banks
serves as lender of last resort to informal banks in the credit creation process. The con-
trast happens if informal banks are independent of formal banks in the credit creation
process.
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JEL Classification:
1 Introduction
Microfinance1 involves the provision of financial services and management of small
amounts of money through a range of products and a system of intermediary func-
tions that are targeted at low income clients. The institution of modern micro-finance
evolved to augment the development agenda of developing countries by serving as
1For the purpose of this study microfinance which is used analogously and interchangeably with
informal banks consists of financial intermediaries that do not participate in the interbank market and
are not required by law to keep reserves with the central banks
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catalyst to minimize poverty and close the inequality gap. This, they achieve by pro-
viding financial and social intermediation services to low income earners and infor-
mal sector that constitute about 80 percent of developing economies. As it is noted,
access to financial services is imperative for the development of the informal sector
and helps to mop up excess liquidity through savings that can be made available as
investment capital for national development (World Bank-Africa Region, 1999).
The structures and modus operandi of microfinance provide solace in the finan-
cial system of most economy by providing clients with products that are flexible and
tailored to offer adequate financial services to the large percentage of people who do
not fit into the commercial banking system. It also serves as a tool to mop up extra
liquidity while offering other social intervention services to bring economic empow-
erment to the poor. Notwithstanding this core objective of their activities, micro-
finance activities have transformed into major financial activities whose activities do
not only center on the poor but also includes activities that compromised the back-
bone of their establishment2.
Over the years, microfinance activities have gain momentum and have grown to
become very important component of modern financial system in both developed
and developing economies. Its share in total financial intermediation has been in-
creasing across countries. It is estimated that the volume of financial activities via
the non-bank sector constitute about 40 percent in total world financial intermedia-
tion (FSB, 2014). Although data is sparse, anecdotal evidence suggests a similar trend
in Ghana. For example, the amount of loans extended by Non-Bank Financial Institu-
tions (NBFIs) increased from GH¢70.63 million in 2003 to GH¢72.85 million in 2004,
suggesting 3.1 percent growth. In 2006, a total of GH¢160.47 million was extended
to clients, which represents 48.8 percent higher than the previous year’s total loans
and advances granted by these micro-finance institutions. The upward- trending of
NBFI’s credit to individuals, small businesses, groups and others indicates marked
improvements in the level of micro-finance and the gradual growth in total financial
2In Ghana, microfinance institution has been the route by which investors without the capital re-
quirement to establish universal banks use to accumulate more capital through deposit. After accumu-
lating the required capital through microfinance activities, they transformed fully into universal bank
operating as universal bank via the microfinance approach. Microfinance institutions such as union
saving loans, capital plus, UT financial services among others have metamorphosed into omini bank,
capital bank and UT bank respectively
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assets in the country. Overall, figures from Bank of Ghana (BoG) indicate that the
share of micro-finance loans and advances as a percentage of total assets of banks
and NBFI loans and advances has increased from 4.8 percent in 2008 to 9.8 percent
in 2013.
There are number of issues associated with the growth of informal credit activ-
ities. First, there is evidence that the operations of informal banks and the tradi-
tional(universal) banks overlaps in most developing economies especially Ghana.
Though, the theory underpinning the emergence of informal banks required them
to operate in different markets, there is evidence 3 that these types of banks operate
in similar market. This parallel operation has caused these banks to compete among
themselves rather than complementing each other in the credit market. Secondly,
informal credit activities do not fall strictly under the regulatory environment of cen-
tral bank as the universal banks. Whiles the universal banks are required by law to
keep some reserve with the central bank 4, informal banks are not mandatory to do
so, even though, their operations are parallel to each other.
The ensuing question following the above problems is that could the interplay of
these banks affect the effectiveness of monetary policy? This is because, banks play
pivotal role in the conduct of monetary policy by serving as the channel through
which monetary impulses are transmitted to the real sector. These are achieved
through the banks relationship with the central bank via various regulatory frame-
work such as the mandatory reserve requirements, discount windows and among
others. Contrary to formal banks, informal banks do not associate with the central
bank on this windows. This notwithstanding, the activities of informal banks parallel
that of formal banks, with informal credit serving as alternative to formal credit in
the credit market. By this, informal credit intermediations serves as leakages in the
money multiplier process. The question therefore is could the parallel operations of
informal banks coupled with its increasing share in credit intermediation affect mon-
etary policy? That is, does the size of informal lending mar or improve transmitting
monetary impulses? In view of these questions, the main objective of the study is to
understand the role of informal credit intermediation in influencing the effectiveness
3 Even though, there is no empirical evidence to support this, trends in the Ghanaian system via
anecdotal reports supports this
4 The central bank conducted monetary policy through the universal banks by using the required
reserve
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of monetary policy in DSGE framework.
2 Brief Literature
The literature identifies few papers that model informal (shadow) credit intermedi-
ation using DSGE approach. The notable ones include Verona et al, (2013), Meeks
et al (2014), Mazelis (2014) and Funke et al, (2015). Though, these papers are closely
related and complement each other in modeling the shadow banking sector, they dif-
fer in some dimension, particularly the role of shadow banks in the economy. Verona
et al (2013) was concerned with the adverse selection effect of shadow banking on
boom bust events caused by persistent low interest rate level. By this, they consid-
ered a financial accelerator DSGE model with formal banks investing in low risky
projects whiles informal retail banks provide funding to riskier firms.
Mazelis (2014) explored the impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate loan
supply with both commercial and shadow banks. The paper extended Gertler and
Karadi (2011) model with a non-bank financial intermediary to distinguish between
bank and non-bank intermediaries based on the liquidity of their credit claims. In
the model, banks could endogenously create deposits to fund their loans, however,
non-banks had to raise deposits on the funding market to function as intermediaries.
The funding market is modeled via search and matching by non-banks for available
deposits of households. The paper showed that because deposit creation responds to
economy-wide productivity automatically, bank reaction to shocks correspond to the
balance sheet channel whiles non-banks are constrained by the available deposits
making their behavior better explained by the lending channel. However, the two
credit channels are affected differently following a monetary policy shock. By these
counteracting effects, the study showed that an increasing non-bank sector leads to a
reduced reaction of aggregate loan supply following a monetary policy shock, which
is consistent with the data.
Meeks et al (2014) modeled the shadow sector similar to Mazelis (2014). How-
ever, unlike Mazelis (2014), Meeks et al, (2014) investigated how financial instability
emanating from commercial banks was unloaded as risky loans to off-balance sheet
shadow banks through securitization.
Funke et al (2015) modeled multifaceted interactions between non-standard mon-
etary policy, the traditional banking sector and shadow banking sector in China to
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analyze monetary policy transmission with parallel shadow banking and different
degrees of interest rate controls. Comparing different interest rate liberalization sce-
narios, the study revealed that monetary policy shock increase feed-through to the
lending rate and investment under complete liberalization. Also, tighter regulation
of interest rates in the commercial banking sector in China led to an increase in loans
provided by the shadow banking sector.
This current study differs from the above existing studies in different dimensions.
The above studies modeled the financial market to include both formal and infor-
mal(shadow) banks operating separately in different markets. In their set-up, formal
banks operate in the low risk enterprise markets whiles informal banks deals with
the high risk market. Unlike these other studies, this current study modeled the in-
formal banks analogous to formal banks. Both formal and informal banks compete
in a common credit market. Thus, banks (formal and informal) exist parallel with
one another performing the same activities. The only difference is that unlike formal
banks who have extra fund from wholesale market, informal banks do not. The study
thus explores how the parallel existence of informal banks with formal banks impacts
on effective monetary policy (i.e. transmission process).
3 The Model
This section outlines the basic framework for the study. The modeling approach fol-
lows a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with banking
intermediation. This study expands the banking sector to include a formal and an
informal bank. Though there is no attempt to model the complex interplay between
formal and informal banks, the modeling technique abstract from the structural re-
lationship between formal and informal banks in Ghana to illustrate policy issues.
The abstracted economy is modeled to consists of six agents. These agents include
the household, entrepreneur, retailers, formal bank, informal bank and the central
bank (government). In the set-up, the banks and household are assumed heteroge-
neous whiles firms are homogeneous 5.
5The informal sector in developing countries particularly Ghana consists largely of household that
engage in SME’s activities. The informal bank emerged to cater for these informal activities because large
firms dealt directly with the formal banks. Therefore, assuming heterogeneous household to capture the
taste for a particular bank proves plausible.
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The model is summarize as follows: There is a continuum of household with s
share as non-Ricardian and 1− s Ricardian household. Ricardian household con-
sumes, works and accumulates wealth by engaging with the financial intermediaries.
They supply deposit and take loans from these banks. Following Gerali et al (2009)
model, within the Ricardian household there are the borrowers (impatient) and savers
(patient) types. The patient household saves by purchasing deposit facilities from
either the formal or informal bank. Impatient household also secure loan facilities
(borrow) from the two financial institutions to finance their consumption. However,
agent differ in their degree of impatience i.e. agents have different discount factors
which they apply to the stream of future utility. The share of patient household is
given by v . The non-Ricardian or Rule of Thumb household do not accumulate
wealth, hence they do not engage with the financial sector. They only supply their
labor and spend their labor income on final goods and services 6.
Both the formal and informal bank accept deposits (in the form of saving instru-
ment) from households and advance loans as well. The banks face homogeneous or
common credit market. Formal banks capture some proportion of the market which
is exogenous determined. The available loan an agent can access is constrained by
the future collateral holdings. Households borrowing are constrained by their future
labor income7. This assumption by which banks collateralize debt with future labor
income is different from studies such as Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al, (2009) that
used housing stock as collateral to borrowing.
The banks operate in a monopolistic competition environment. Thus, they set
interest rates on deposits and loans in order to maximize profits. The formal bank
finances its’ loan by the amount of deposits it accumulates from the household and
wholesale market whiles the informal bank loan is financed from deposit accumu-
6Applying DSGE modeling technique to developing economies usually suffers from the rational ex-
pectation criticism. This criticism is premised on the grounds that the proportion of the poor who can
barely cater for their immediate need is high. As a result, they do not engage in inter-temporal rational
expectation but rather naively extrapolate their current income into the future. Also, even if they do,
they weigh their current income too heavily when looking ahead to their future income because current
income is the only salient piece of information available to them. Their role in the model is captured by
their proportion which affects the rational expectation dynamics.
7 The study adopted this assumption because it is consistent with how financial institutions advance
loans to households in Ghana. Even though, formal banks accepts fixed assets as collateral, we assume
both banks accept future income as collateral for simplicity
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lated from the household and loans from the formal bank. Given that the formal
bank secures additional income from the wholesale market but the informal banks
do not, the capital structure of the formal bank is thus related to the central bank via
the wholesale activities. On the other hand the Informal bank’s capital is not related
to wholesale lending activities. By this means, the central bank can control the credit
supply of formal bank but not that of informal bank.
Workers are assumed to supply identical labor services. The labor services are
supplied through a competitive labor packer that supplies unitary labor inputs to
firms. As result there exist a unique wage obtained in a competitive setting. In addi-
tion, there is a monopolistic competitive retail sector which purchases intermediate
goods in a competitive market from the entrepreneur. The retailer brands the inter-
mediate goods at no cost and sell the differentiated goods at a price which includes
a mark-up over purchasing cost and adjustment cost. To fix the modeling ideas and
notation, the proceeding sections deals with each sector in turns.
3.1 Household
The household block consists of s rule of thumb and 1− s Ricardian. The Ricardian
owns firms and financial assets in the economy. Within the Ricardian group are v
fraction of patient household denoted as p and 1− v impatient household denoted
as m. The difference in agents arise from the discount factor, which is higher for
patient agents than impatient agents. The size of the discount factor indicates the
level of impatient in agent which determines the magnitude of borrowing. Using βh
to represent the discount factor, the representative household group maximizes the
expected utility given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βst
C hi t 1−θ
1−θ −
N hi t
1+φ
1+φ
 (3.1)
For h ∈ {p,m} Where p and m represents patient and impatient household respec-
tively. Ct and Nt denote consumption and labor supply respectively. θ is the risk
averse parameter which indicates the risk behavior of the household.
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3.1.1 Patient Household
The patient household finances expenditure on current consumption C pt and de-
posits D t with stream of resources consisting of wage earnings
(
Wt N
p
i t
)
, gross in-
come of previous deposit
[
1+Rdt−1
pit
]
Di t−1 and a lump sum transfer (T p ). The lump
sum transfers include both dividend from the retail firms and the banking sector.
Formally, the budget constraint of the representative household in real term is thus
specified as
C pi t +Di t =Wt N
p
i t +
1+Rdt−1
pit
Di t−1+T p (3.2)
pit is the gross inflation defined as Pt /Pt−1 and Wt is the wage rate. The total de-
posit D t held by the household is the aggregation of deposit appropriated between
formal and informal bank. Rdt is the aggregate interest index paid on deposits. The
household maximizes it’s expected utility given by equation (3.1) subject to the bud-
get constraint by optimally choosing deposit, labor supply and consumption. The
resulting first order conditions from the maximization problem are given by
λ
p
t C
p
t
θ = 1 (3.3)
Wt =C pt
θ
N Pt
φ
(3.4)
λ
p
t =βp Et
(
λ
p
t+1
1+Rdt
pit+1
)
(3.5)
Where λpt as the budget constraint multiplier
3.1.2 Impatient Household
The impatient household neither hold deposits nor own retail firms but only receive
income from their labor service. They only incur expenditure on their current con-
sumption and reimbursement of past borrowings. These expenses are financed with
income from labor services and new borrowing. The budget constraint facing the
household is
C mi t +
1+Rbmt−1
pit
B mi t−1 =Wt N mi t +B mi t +T m (3.6)
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B mt is the aggregate loan secured from both formal and informal banks. R
bm
t is
the aggregate interest index charged on the loan. The amount of new borrowing the
household can secure from the bank is constrained by the expected value of its collat-
eral. The household uses the future value of her labor income as collateral 8 to secure
loan from the financial sector. To satisfy the non-Ponzi assumption, the expected
value of the collateral services should be sufficient to guarantee debt repayment. This
constraint is specified as
(1+Rbmt )B mi t =µmt Et
[
Wt+1N mi t pit+1
]
(3.7)
where µmt is the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) for labor income.
The household maximizes equation 3.1 subject to both the expenditure and bor-
rowing constraints. Using λmt and V
m
t as the budget constraint multiplier and bor-
rowing constraint multiplier respectively, the FOCs are then given as
λmt C
m
t
θ = 1 (3.8)
N mt
φ =λmt Wt +V mt µmt Et [Wt+1pit+1] (3.9)
(1+Rbmt )V mt +βmEt
[
λmt+1
(
1+Rbmt
pit+1
)]
=λmt (3.10)
3.1.3 Non-Ricardian
The non-Ricardian or rule of thumb household do not have access to financial mar-
kets. They are only concerned about their labor income. This gives rise to their bud-
get constraint as
crt =Wt N rt (3.11)
8Unlike Gerali et al, (2009) that used housing as collateral for the household, this study used labor
income. This assumption is consistent with bank lending practices to household in developing countries
especially Ghana, where household borrow against their labor income. Although, formal banks accept
fixed assets and other forms of collateral, this study assumed both banks uses labor income as collateral
for simplicity.
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3.1.4 Loans Demand and Deposit Supply
Loan Demand: Household borrow from formal and informal banks designated as
f and I respectively. The aggregate loans are given by a composite CES basket of
slightly differentiated products which are each supplied by a formal bank j and in-
formal bank j .
To capture the market power that characterize the banking industry, the study fol-
lows Benes and Lees (2007) and Arce and Andres (2008) to treat the credit market
analogously as the standard Dixit-Stieglitz framework for the goods market. In this
set-up, each agent demands loan contract from each single financial institution in
order to borrow one unit of resources. The aggregate loan demanded by a household
i is expressed as
B mt =
(
g
1
²m bm ft
²m−1
²m + (1− g ) 1²m bmIt
²m−1
²m
) ²m
²m−1
(3.12)
g is the share of formal bank loan in household credit basket. b represents loans
obtained from the banks. ²m is the elasticity of substitution between the formal and
informal credits 9.
Denoting r bm ft and r
bmI
t as the interest rate facing household from formal and
informal bank respectively, the total due payment to household for borrowing from
each sector is specified as∫ 1
0
r bm ft ( j )B
m f
t ( j )d j +
∫ 1
0
r bmIt ( j )B
mI
t ( j )d j (3.13)
The demand schedule is thus derived by minimizing the total interest payment sub-
ject to the aggregate loan demand in equation 3.12 Aggregating f.o.c’s across impa-
tient agent result in the demand for credit from various sectors as
B m ft = g
[
r bm ft
Rbmt
]−²m
B mt (3.14)
B mIt = (1− g )
[
r bmIt
Rbmt
]−²m
B mt (3.15)
9The elasticity measures competition between formal and informal credit in the household credit
basket
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The average interest rate on loans to household is given by the composite aggregation
Rbmt =
[
g r bm ft
1−²m + (1− g )r bmIt
1−²m
] 1
1−²m
(3.16)
Deposit Supply:The patient household supplies deposit to both the formal and
informal sector. The household aggregate basket of deposit is a composite of both
the formal and informal deposit which is expressed as
D t =
(
k
1
²d D ft
²d−1
²d + (1−k)
1
²d D It
²d−1
²d
) ²d
²d−1
(3.17)
k is the share of formal sector deposit in the household deposit basket. D ft and D
I
t
are the deposits held with formal and informal bank respectively. ²d is the elasticity
of substitution between the formal and informal deposit. The household maximizes
the total return specified in equation 3.18 from saving with the banks. Where r d ft and
r d It respectively denote formal and informal deposit rate∫ 1
0
r d ft ( j )D
f
t ( j )d j +
∫ 1
0
r d It ( j )D
I
t ( j )d j (3.18)
Subject to equation 3.17 Aggregating across household results in the deposit supplied
to each bank as
D ft = kD t
[
r d ft
Rdt
]−²d
(3.19)
D It = (1−k)D t
[
r d It
Rdt
]−²d
(3.20)
The average lending rate is also given as
Rdt =
[
kr d ft
1−²d + (1−k)r d It
1−²d
] 1
1−²d
(3.21)
3.2 Financial Intermediation Sector
The financial sector is the key sector of this model. There are two types of financial
intermediaries - formal and informal bank. In the model set-up, we assume there
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is a common credit market which faces the financial institutions. In reality these
banks operate in segmented markets. Whiles formal banks service the formal sector
of the economy i.e. low risk agents, informal banks in contrast emerged to cater for
the informal economy which are perceived the high risk agents. However, we make
assumption of common market for two reasons:
• Firstly, there is a common trend in Ghana where the activities of these banks
overlap10. With the exception of medium and large scale firms that mostly bank
with formal banks, both banks compete over the household market. Since, we
modeled the banks to only deal with household it suffice to make the assump-
tion of common market to depict this situation in Ghana.
• Secondly, the main aim of this study is to investigate how competition be-
tween formal and informal banks in the intermediation process affect mon-
etary transmission. Therefore, modeling banks to operate in common market
will bring forth this competition with simplicity. Therefore, the common mar-
ket assumption is made for modeling simplification.
The only saving instrument offered by banks to patient households is bank de-
posits. Also, the only way impatient households can borrow from the banks is by
applying for a bank loan. A feature of the banks is the ability of them to set rates
on their instruments. The banks compete among themselves within each sector and
also between Sectors to collect deposits and supply loans.
We also assume that banks obey a balance sheet identity where banks can finance
their loans Bt using either deposit D t or bank capital (equity) K bt as in
Bt =D t +K bt
In view of the balance sheet identity, the two sources of finance are substitutes. How-
ever, banks are assumed to have exogenous optimal leverage (capital-to-asset) ratio.
This introduces imperfect substitution in the balance sheet constraint. The optimal
constraint is perceived as banks decision regarding how much of it’s own resources
10The 2014 edition of Ghana banking survey conducted by Price Water Coopers(PWC) identified non
traditional credit sources as the major challenge facing the traditional sources, thus causing threats to
their operations. Though, there is no empirical evidence on credit overlap, the identify threat show some
evidence that the two types of banks operate in a similar market
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to hold. By this assumption, bank capital will have a key role in determining the con-
ditions of credit supply, both for quantities and for prices.
The formal bank participates in the credit wholesale market hence has access to
additional funds from this market. On the contrary, the informal bank does not have
access to the wholesale market, rather, informal bank can obtain extra fund from
the formal sector and also deposit excess funds with them. By this assumption, the
central bank can control the supply of credit of the formal bank by influencing the
reserve structure of formal banks but not that of the informal bank. The goal of the
banks is to maximize profit from the intermediation process.
3.2.1 Formal Bank
This bank consists of a wholesale branch and retail branch. The wholesale branch
manages the wholesale credit activities of the bank. The retail branch is responsible
for raising differentiated deposits from the household and giving out differentiated
loans.
Wholesale Branch: The wholesale branch combines net worth (capital and de-
posit) to issue loans on the wholesale market. The bank invests in liquid asset. The
asset can always be exchanged against central bank liquidity if it desires to increase
liquidity on the wholesale market. Given the identical funding structure across whole-
sale banks, the interest paid on deposit will be the same across banks11. The interest
rate prevailing in the wholesale market is thus determined by the profit maximizing
behavior of the banks. However, given the banks similarity, banks considering lend-
ing in the wholesale market takes the policy rate set by the central bank as given and
decides optimally about the amount of liquidity to supply.
The wholesale activity is assumed to generate a cost related to the capital position
of the bank. That is the bank pays a quadratic cost whenever the capital to asset ratio(
K bt
B
f
t
)
is in disequilibrium with the optimal value (V b). The bank also retains part of
the profit that accrued to the bank. Denoting the ratio of bank profit retained as ωb ,
δb as the resources used in managing bank capital and conducting overall intermedi-
ation process and J b as the profit of the bank, then the capital of the bank accumulate
11It is assumed that the difference between the interest rate paid on deposits and the interest obtained
from the investment in the liquid asset is negligible as a result, the optimization problem of the bank
can be ignored.
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according to;
K bj t = (1−δb)K b,nj t−1+ωb J b,nj t−1 (3.22)
The problem of this branch is thus to choose loans (B ft ) and deposit (D
f
t ) so as to
maximize profit subject to a balance sheet constraint. Specifically,
M axE0
∞∑
0
λ
p
0,t
(1+Rbt )B j t − (1+Rdt )D j t −K bj t − Kkb2
 K bj t
Bt ( j )
−V b
2 K bj t
 (3.23)
s.t.
B fj t =D
f
j t +K bj t (3.24)
The first order condition derived by linking the spread between wholesale rates on
loans and deposit with the leverage ratio is given as
Rbt =Rdt −kkb
K bj t
B fj t
−V b
K bj t
B fj t
2 (3.25)
The model is closed by assuming that banks invest any excess fund in a deposit fa-
cility at the central bank remunerated a rate rt such that Rdt = Rt . 12 Assuming the
wholesale market operate under a perfect competitive sittings, then the wholesale
loan rate prevailing on market can be specified as
Rbt = rt −kkb
K bj t
B fj t
−V b
K bj t
B fj t
2 (3.26)
Equation 3.26 postulates the role of capital in determining loan supply. The relation
indicates that as far as there exist wedge between loan and the policy rate the bank
would increase loan supply, which will consequently increase leverage and profit per
unit capital (i.e. return on equity). At the same time, increasing leverage reduces
profit since the capital-to-asset ratio moves away from the cost (V b). This trade-off
causes the bank to choose loan level such that the marginal cost for reducing the
capital-to-asset ratio is exactly equal to the loan-deposit spread.
Retail Branch: This bank takes wholesale loans at the rate Rbt , differentiate them at
zero cost and resell them to impatient household. The liability of the bank therefore
comprises deposits and wholesale loans. The balance sheet of a formal bank is given
by Table 1
12This can also be viewed as banks purchasing government bond
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Table 1: Balance Sheet of a Formal Bank
Assets Liability
Loans Deposit
wholesale Loans
The bank also gives loan facility to the informal when the later needs extra. The
bank advances the loan to the informal bank at the same rate as the rate advanced
to household. The bank maximizes over both interest r d ft and r
b f
t . The bank faces
quadratic adjustment cost for changing rates they charge on loans. The rational is to
introduce stickiness to capture imperfect pass-through. Parametrizing the cost the
branch incur from extending loans to and collecting deposits from household as Kb f
and Kd f respectively, then the profit of the bank can be specified as:
E0
∞∑
0
Qpt
{
r b ft ( j )B
f
t ( j )+ r b ft ( j )B it − r d ft ( j )D ft ( j )− r d ft D it −Rbt I Bt ( j )−
kb f
2
 r b fj t
r b fj t−1
−1
2 r b ft B ft − kd f2
 r d fj t
r d fj t−1
−1
2 r d ft De ft } (3.27)
As deposits and loans are imperfect substitute both for banks within and between
sectors, the maximization problem is subject to the following demand and supply
function for household loan and deposits.
B fj t = g
 r b fj t
Rbmt
−²
m
t
B mt (3.28)
D ft ( j )= k
r d fj t
Rdt
−²
d
t
D t (3.29)
with I Bt =B ft
The first order conditions yields the interest rate function for loans and deposit re-
spectively as
1−²mt +
(
Rbt
r b ft
)
²mt +
B It
B ft
−kb f
(
r b ft
r b ft−1
−1
)
r b ft
r b ft−1
+Qp Et
(λpt+1
λ
p
t
)
kb f
(
r b ft+1
r b ft
)2 (
r b ft+1
r b ft
−1
)(
B ft+1
B ft
)= 0
15
−1+²dt −²dt
(
Rdt
r d ft
)
−D
I
t
D ft
−kd f
(
r d ft
r d ft−1
−1
)
r d ft
r d ft−1
+Qp Et
(λpt+1
λ
p
t
)
kd f
(
r d ft+1
r d ft
)2 (
r d ft+1
r d ft
−1
)(
D ft+1
D ft
)= 0
The simplified version of the loan and deposit setting rates are given by the log-
linearized version of the above equation by assuming ²st is non-stochastic. This is
specified as
r̂t
b f = kb f
R∗²mt + (1+Qp )kb f
r̂t−1b f +
Qp Kb f
R∗²mt + (1+Qp )kb f
Et r̂t+1b f +
²mt R
∗
²mt + (1+Qp )kb f
R̂t
b + B
∗
R∗²mt + (1+Qp )kb f
(B̂t
I − B̂t f ) (3.30)
r̂t
d f = kd f
R∗d²
d
t + (1+Qp )kd f
r̂t−1d f +
Qp Kd f
R∗d²
d
t + (1+Qp )kb f
Et r̂t+1d f +
R∗d²
d
t
R∗d²
d
t + (1+Qp )kd f
r̂t + D
∗
R∗d²
d
t + (1+Qp )kd f
(D̂ t
I − D̂ t f ) (3.31)
Where
R∗ = Rss
b
r ssb f
B∗ = B ss
I
B ss f
R∗d =
r ss
r ssd f
D∗ = Dss
I
Dss f
The simplified loan-setting equation shows that loan rates set by the formal banks
takes into account the expected future path of the wholesale rate. The wholesale
rate from equation (3.26) depends on the policy rate and the capital position of the
bank. Also, equation 3.31 shows that banks set the deposit interest rate to take into
account the expected future level of policy rate. The speed of adjustment to changes
in the policy rate depends on the degree of substitution between informal and formal
deposits and the adjustment cost.
Interest pass-through is given by
∂r̂t
b f
∂r̂t
= R
∗²mt
R∗²mt + (1+Qp )kb f
(3.32)
16
From equation (3.32), the pass-through depends on the elasticity of substitution be-
tween formal and informal loans as well as the cost of changing interest rates. If
formal and informal loans are perfect substitute i.e. ²mt = 1, then
∂r̂t
b f
∂r̂t
= R
∗
R∗+ (1+Qp )kb f
This makes pass-through a function of only cost of adjusting prices and discount
factor. In situations where informal bank does not interact with the formal bank in
terms of accessing extra from them, the pass-through coefficient becomes
∂r̂t
b f
∂r̂t
= ²
m
t −1
²mt −1+ (1+Qp )kb f
(3.33)
Perfect substitution reduces the pass-through estimate to
∂r̂t
b f
∂r̂t
= 0
This shows that monetary policy is ineffective in influencing retail rates if formal
and informal credits are perfect substitute in the agents basket of credit demand.
This postulates that monetary effectiveness depends magnificently on the elastic-
ity of substitution between formal and informal credit. The more elastic the substi-
tutability the more effective is the monetary policy. From the above analysis, it can
be inferred that as credit market becomes segmented the influence of informal credit
intermediation becomes negligible.
3.2.2 Informal Bank
The informal sector operates parallel to the formal sector in the credit intermedia-
tion process. The distinct feature is that unlike the formal bank, the informal bank
do not engage in wholesale credit intermediation, hence they do not have wholesale
unit. However, this bank deposits its’ excess fund with the formal bank and obtain
excess funds from them as well when they run out of liquidity at the prevailing rate
of the formal bank. By this, their interest rate setting condition is not directly af-
fected by central bank action (i.e. Policy rate), rather via the intermediate route of
formal banks. The bank collect deposits (D It ) from patient household and pays them
interest rate r d It . Also, the bank extend loans B
I
t to households at rate r
bI
t . Like the
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formal bank, the informal bank incurs quadratic adjustment cost to collect deposit
and make loans as well. The bank solves the following problem
M axE0
∞∑
0
Qpt
{
r bij t B
i
j t + r d ft D it − r b ft B it − r dij t D it −
kbi
2
 r bij t
r bit−1
−1
2 r bit B it
− kdi
2
 r dij t
r dit−1
−1
2 r d It D it} (3.34)
subject to
D Ij t = (1−k)
r d Ij t
Rdt
−²dt D t (3.35)
B ij t ( j )= (1− g )
 r bij t
Rbmt
−²mt B mt (3.36)
The first order conditions imposing symmetric condition of r d It ( j ) = r d It at equilib-
rium result in the pricing relation for deposit and loans respectively specified as
−1+²dt −
(
r d ft
r d It
)
²dt −kd I
(
r d It
r d It−1
−1
)
r d It
r d It−1
+Qp
[(
λ
p
t+1
λ
p
t
)
kd I
(
r d It+1
r d It
)2 (
r d It+1
r d It
−1
)(
D It+1
D It
)]
= 0
1−²mt +
(
r b ft
r bIt
)
²mt −kbI
(
r bIt
r bIt−1
−1
)
r bIt
r bIt−1
+Qp
[(
λ
p
t+1
λ
p
t
)
kbmI
(
r bIt+1
r bIt
)2 (
r bIt+1
r bIt
−1
)(
B It+1
B It
)]
= 0
The log-linearized version of the loan rate for the informal sector when ²s is as-
sumed to be non-stochastic is given
r̂t
bI = kbI
²m − (1+Qp )kbI
r̂t−1bI +
Qp Kb f
²m − (1+Qp )kbI
Et r̂t+1bI + ²
m −1
²m − (1+Qp )kb f
r̂t
b f
(3.37)
r̂t
d I = kd I
²d − (1+Qp )kd I
r̂t−1d I +
Qp Kd f
²d − (1+Qp )kd I
Et r̂t+1d I + ²
d −1
²d − (1+Qp )kb f
r̂t
d f
(3.38)
From the equation, the loan rate in this sector does not depend on the wholesale
rate. Rather, it depends on rates set by formal banks. These unique characteristics
make the informal sector price-setting directly dependent on formal activities but
indirect dependent on monetary authorities.
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3.3 Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur produces intermediate good by combining effective labor in per-
fect competitive environment. The firm uses a Cobb-Douglas production technology
function given as
Yt (i )= At Nt (i )1−α (3.39)
Where Yt , and Nt denote intermediate good and aggregate labor from household
respectively. At represent the level of technology which evolves exogenous according
to an AR(1) stochastic process. The firm maximizes each period profit
P wt Yt −Wt Nt
subject to its technology specified in equation 3.39 taking P w wage as given. The first
order condition yields
Wt
P w
= (1−α)At N−αt (3.40)
3.4 Retailer
Retailers are only branders who purchase intermediate goods from entrepreneurs at
wholesale price P wt . They operate in a monopolistic competitive environment and
differentiate the goods at zero cost. Retailers set price at a mark-up over wholesale
price and index prices to past prices at degree. Retailers index prices to a combina-
tion of past and steady state inflation, with relative weights parametrized by l . They
also face quadratic price adjustment cost kp when changing prices. The rational is to
introduce price stickiness in the model. Retailers thus solve the problem
Et
∞∑
t=0
λPt
[
pt ( j )yt ( j )−PWt yt ( j )−
kp
2
(
pt ( j )
pt−1( j )
−pilt−1pi1−l
)2
pt yt
]
(3.41)
subject to a consumption aggregate
yt ( j )=
(
pt ( j )
pt
)−²yt
yt (3.42)
Imposing symmetric equilibrium, the FOC result in a non-linearized Philip curve for
price inflation is specified as
1−²yt +²yt
P w
P
−kp (pit −pilt−1pi1−l )pit +βp Et
[
λ
p
t+1
λ
p
t
kp (pit+1−piltpi1−l )pit+1
yt+1
yt
]
= 0
(3.43)
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3.5 Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy through a Taylor-rule function. It sets
the short-term nominal interest rate (policy rate), Rt , in response to deviation of out-
put yt and inflation pit from their respective target level. The interest rate reaction
function is given as:
Rt = ²Rt r
(pit
pi
)φpi ( yt
yt−1
)φy
where φpi and φy are the weights assigned to inflation and output stabilization re-
spectively. r is the steady state nominal interest rate and ²Rt is an exogenous shock to
monetary policy.
3.6 Aggregation
Given that s share of household are non-optimizers and z share of optimizing house-
holds as savers, then aggregate labour and consumption are given respectively as
Nt = sN rt + z(1− s)Lpt + (1− s)(1− z)Lmt (3.44)
Ct = sC rt + z(1− s)C pt + (1− s)(1− z)C mt (3.45)
4 Model Analysis
This section analyzes the model behavior by investigating the model’s reaction to
perturbations in the economy. First, the study pins down the model parametriza-
tion. Then, investigates how monetary policy shock propagates through the econ-
omy, both with and without informal banks. Further, the study investigate the effect
of monetary policy on aggregate loan supply depending on the relative share of in-
termediation via the informal banking system in the economy.
4.1 Steady State and Log-Linear
Following from the necessary conditions obtained in the previous section and pre-
sented in the appendix, the steady state of the model were estimated and the log lin-
ear version for studying the dynamics of the study were also presented. The steady
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states are obtained by dropping the time index associated with the necessary con-
ditions. The reduced steady states equations are presented in section ?? in the ap-
pendix. From the steady state equations, the ratio of formal interest rate to informal
rate for both loans and deposits is a mark-up that are given respectively as the elastic-
ity of substitution for the two types of loans and deposits. Using an appropriate initial
values, we estimate the steady states value using nonlinear equation solver. We solve
the steady state using Newton method with quadratic searching. Using a tolerance
level of 1e-1 for 1-norm of residuals, the search was done using 500 iterations.
The log-linear version of the necessary conditions are given by a first order Taylor
approximation around the steady states. The full lists of equations are presented in
section in the appendix.
4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated for the Ghanaian economy using monthly frequency as the
time unit. Since the innovative part of the model is with the introduction of the in-
formal banks and its relation with the formal banks, the model calibration focused
on this part. These parameters were calibrated to replicate the statistical properties
of Ghanaian data and to ensure steady state. The rest of the parameters were also
calibrated using Ghana’s data. However, those that were not easily calibrated or not
available for Ghana were sourced from the literature.
The share of household that are non-optimizing (rule of thumb) is set at 0.25 .
This is set in line with extreme poverty ratio 13. The proportion of patient (savers)
household is set at 0.1849 in accordance to 2014 national saving rate14.
In line with the average monthly rate on fixed deposit rate among commercial
banks for the year 2014, the steady state of formal deposit rate r d f is set at 15 percent.
The average base rate for commercial banks is used for the formal sector lending rate.
Using average between 2005 and 2014, the steady state formal lending rate r b f is set
at 28 percent. In the same way, using the average monthly deposit rate among micro-
finance institutions for the year 2014, informal deposit rate r di is set at 25 percent.
The steady state informal lending rate r bi is set at 35 percent. At steady state the
13We chose the poverty ratio because its assumed poor individuals are only concern about their current
consumption and do not undergo forward looking activities
14The saving rate is sourced from World Bank database
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNS.ICTR.ZS?locations=GH
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Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
θ 2 φ 1.5
α 0.5 φpi 1.5
φy 0.5 vb 0.09
δb 0.15 kb f 70
kd f 110 kbi 60
kdi 100 ²
m 6
²d 2.5 ρa 0.95
ρer 0.95 s 0.25
g 0.8 v 0.1849
βp 0.995 βm 0.975
µ 0.03 kp 2
kkb 5 ²
y 2
ratio of formal rate to informal rate gives the mark-up in the informal rate. Hence,
from the steady state values of formal and informal rates, the resulting elasticity of
substitution is set at 2.5 and 6 for deposit elasticity of substitution ²d and lending
elasticity of substitution ²m respectively. The full list of calibrated parameters are
shown in Table 2
4.3 Model Characteristics
This section presents the model properties and compare with observed data. The
essence is to ascertain the fitness of the model and its’ appropriateness for further
analysis. We do this by comparing moments of the theoretical model to the estimated
values from observed data. We compare only with the banking variables, however,
the other variables are presented for illustrations. Figure 3 depicts the graph of retail
lending rate for the observed data whiles Figure4 is the graph of series from simulated
data. A qualitative inspection of the graphs for retail lending rate in both figures show
that the two graphs exhibit some common features. It is evident that even though the
simulated figure show some high persistence, the two graphs exhibit similar trends.
Table 3 report the standard deviation and variance decomposition for the HP-
filtered series in the model. The variance decomposition provides the contribution
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of the errors of the simulations of the endogenous variables in relation to exogenous
shocks. Results from Table 3 shows that monetary shock explain very well changes in
the monetary variables.
Table 3: Standard Deviation and Variance Decomposition
Variance Decomposition
VARIABLE Standard Deviation. zer za
r 0.4781 90.62 9.38
pi 0.0134 90.99 9.01
r b f 0.3347 88.45 11.55
r d f 0.4800 90.62 9.38
b 1.1249 85.02 14.98
d 1.0970 84.20 15.80
Another way to learn about the model characteristics is to examine the Impulse
Response Function (IRF). Thus we explore the response of key variables to contrac-
tion monetary policy shock. The responses of selected aggregate variables to one
standard deviation reduction of the short-term policy rate are shown in Figure 5. As
the graph depicts, the model is able to replicate some of the qualitative results in the
standard New Keynesian literature. A contraction monetary shock cause the policy
rate to rise initially and falls gradually. This mechanism is because central banks re-
act to output and inflation endogenously by lowering the nominal rate. As a result,
the initial increase is overcompensated by the endogenous reaction due to the shock.
This causes the shock to diminish along the way. Also, a contraction monetary policy
causes both output and inflation to fall. Real aggregate lending rate falls as well. The
combine effect of decrease in real interest rate and inflation results in an increase in
nominal lending interest rate. This consequently leads to a fall in loans to the house-
holds. Following from the above description, the model has the advantage to enrich
the inter-linkages between macroeconomic and financial variables including the in-
formal sector, while able to replicate stylized facts in business cycle theory.
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4.4 Interest Rate Response to Policy Shock with informal credit
In this section, we assess whether and how the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy is affected by the presence of informal credit intermediation. We focus on the
behaviour of interest rate by analysing the IRF to an unanticipated one standard de-
viation exogenous shock to the policy rate. Though the model description presents
different monetary transmission channels15, we focus mainly on interest rate chan-
nel which is the key monetary transmission channel. Here we study the modified
interest rate channel which is affected by the the presence of heterogeneous agents
with different degree of patience. The level of impatience as described above is de-
picted by agents having different discount factor.
From the model description, the effect of informal activities on interest rate in the
formal sector is captured by the elasticity of substitution between formal and infor-
mal loans. As a result, we investigate how different levels of elasticity of substitution
between formal and informal credits affect the way interest rate respond to monetary
shock. We investigate this in two scenarios. First, we consider the situation where for-
mal banks serve as lender of last resort to informal banks: A situation where informal
bank secures extra funds from the formal bank in periods when the former is liquidity
constrained. Secondly, we consider the situation where the informal is self-sufficient
thus independent of the formal bank in its intermediation process.
To determine the influence of informal credit intermediation on monetary trans-
mission, we consider the IRF for different levels of the elasticity of substitution. Graph
1 shows the graph of impulse response for lending rate for three different levels of
elasticity of substitution for loans: ²m ∈ {0.5,1,6}. The graph depicts the situation
where the informal bank depends on the formal bank for extra funds in situation its
liquidity constrained. From the graph, it can be observed that the more elastic the
elasticity of substitution, the more responsive is the formal interest rate to monetary
shock. This can be explained in the following way. Formal banks respond more be-
cause it will explode the rates of informal loans due to the later dependence on the
former. By this, formal banks achieve competitive advantage over informal banks in
the credit market thus increasing their market share.
15In addition to interest rate channel, the model characteristics present other channel such as the
borrowing constraint channel. This channel is the situation where an innovation in the policy rate
alters the net present value of the collateral thereby changing how binding agents’ constraints are
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Figure 1: IRF to Monetary Shocks for ²m for dependent informal bank.
On the other hand, the evidence for the situation where informal bank is self-
sufficient thus independent of formal bank is different. Graph 2 show the IRF for
interest rate for different level of ²m when the informal bank is independent of for-
mal bank. The graph16 shows that interest rate is less responsive to monetary shock
when elasticity is large. Contrary to scenario one, here formal bank react marginally
to policy shock to enable it still have competitive edge in the credit market. This is be-
cause informal rates are not affected by the shock either directly or indirectly. There-
fore, unlike scenario one where the interdependence between the banks nullify the
inter-sector competition, the competition between the two banks is very intense in
scenario two.
In a nutshell, the influence of informal credit activities on the behavious of interest
rate reaction to monetary shocks depend on the interrelationship that exist between
formal and informal banks.
16The IRF was compute for ²m > 1 i.e. ²m ∈ {2,4,6} because values of ²m ≤ 1 results in model insta-
bility
25
Figure 2: IRF to Monetary Shocks for ²m for independent informal bank.
5 Conclusion
The study developed a DSGE model with informal credit intermediaion. The aim is to
identify the effect of parallel activities of informal banks and formal banks on mon-
etary transmission. The study found that the presences of informal intermediation
affect how interest rate react to monetary policy shocks. The effect however, depends
on the relationship between formal and informal bank in the intermediation process.
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Figure 3: Lending Rate (Observed data.)
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Figure 4: Graph from simulated data.
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Figure 5: IRF to one S.D shock.
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